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Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on the financial performance of selected companies 
quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange over the period 2014 – 2018. The study uses a survey research design. The 
sample of the study covers fifteen companies from different sectors of the Nigerian stock exchange. Financial 
performance was captured by using return on investment, while the independent variable corporate governance 
was denominated by the percentage of attendance of board meeting and board size. All data were collected from 
the companies’ annual reports. The companies’ ages, firm and debt to equity ratio were used as control measures. 
The model was estimated using the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares estimation technique (POLS). Results from 
this study generally indicate that Board Activity and Board size have a significant positive impact on financial 
performance.  The correlation matrix also shows that there is a positive significant linear relationship between the 
proxies of corporate governance and ROI. The study recommends that corporate governance should be given more 
priority in companies given its capacity to contribute to financial performance, as such all four null hypotheses are 
therefore rejected. Based on these results, shareholders are encouraged to request for access to adequate director’s 
report at Annual General Meetings. Likewise, since Board activity and size have been shown to be strong 
predictors of firm performance, shareholders can make informed investment decisions by comparing attendance 
at board meetings and size of the boards. Further studies should consider other measures of the strength of the 
board such as board diversity and Number or frequency of meetings.  Similarly, future research works can utilize 
larger sample.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent cases of corporate scandals such as Volkswagen’s  cheating emission tests in September 2015 and Exxon’s 
deliberate misinformation of the public for decades as well as earlier celebrated cases of corporate governance 
failures such as that of Enron Corporation in October 2001, Xerox in June 2002, WorldCom in march 2002, 
Adelphia in April 2002, and Global crossing in February 2002 have turned the world’s attention to the broader 
problem of irresponsibility of many corporates and the imperativeness of establishing reliable corporate 
governance framework that protects the interest of all stakeholders thereby bringing back people’s trust in 
corporations. 
OECD (2004) noted that the purpose of corporate governance is to help build an environment of trust, 
transparency and accountability necessary for fostering long-term investment, financial stability and business 
integrity, thereby supporting stronger growth and more inclusive societies. According to PWC (2015) some of the 
benefits for corporate governance are that firstly it brings about higher confidence among all stakeholders in the 
business’s ability to generate value in the future. Secondly, it endows organisations with strategic advantage over 
their competitors. Thirdly, organizations with good corporate governance framework develop greater resilience 
both to sudden shocks and long-term change. Ultimately, all these benefits come together in a single, invaluable 
asset which is higher trust. An organisation that is evidently well-governed will generate stronger trust both 
internally and externally, this translates to competitive advantage for the company over its competitors. 
McKinsey and Company (2002) in a research cited in Adams and Mehran (2003) noted that the study showed 
how much investors valued the presence of good governance. According to the report most investors in Malaysia 
showed the desire to pay more for the shares of a well governed company. The research also showed that the 
investors were ready to pay a mean premium within the limit of 20% to 25%. 
This topic is of significance to theorists giving the divergence of opinion in normative literature on the effect 
of corporate governance on financial performance. A school of thought believe that corporate governance does not 
necessarily influence the performance of corporates while others are of the view that corporate governance can be 
a potent means of influencing corporate performance. 
Also this work is of relevance to empirical literature given the divergent conclusions of existing studies on 
the impact of corporate governance on financial performance. While numerous works conducted on this topic the 
results have been divergent some have concluded that there exists a positive relationship while others have declared 
that there is no verifiable effect of corporate governance on firm performance. 
This study therefor will be fill the research gaps. Firstly, this research adopts board attendance as a measure 
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of corporate governance and ROI as a measure of financial performance. Secondly this study investigates the 
intervening effect of variables such as age of company, debt to equity ratio of the firms and firm size.    
 
1.1 Research questions 
1. To what extent does board size affect the ROI of quoted companies   in Nigeria? 
2. Does attendance of board meetings have a significant effect on the ROI of quoted companies   in Nigeria? 
3. Is there a significant linear relationship between Board Activity and ROI of firms? 
4. To what degree does Board Size affect the ROI of firms? 
 
1.2 Research objectives 
1. To investigate the effect of board size on the ROI of quoted companies   in Nigeria 
2. To study the effect of attendance of board meetings on the ROI of quoted companies in Nigeria 
3. To ascertain whether or not there exists a correlational relationship between Board Activity and ROI. 
4. To determine whether there exists a significant linear relationship between Board Size and ROI. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
2.1.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is a mechanism which tries to eliminate the principle-agent problem by ensuring 
accountability to stakeholders (Chaudhary& Gakhar 2018). Du Plessis, Bagaric et al. (2010) suggested that the 
ultimate goal for corporate governance should be toward the optimisation of efficiency and productivity, hence 
define corporate governance as: The system of regulating and overseeing corporate conduct and of balancing the 
interests of all internal stakeholders and other parties who can be affected by the corporation’s conduct in order to 
ensure responsible behaviour by corporations and to achieve the maximum level of efficiency and profitability for 
a corporation (Du Plessis, Bagaric et al. 2010, p. 10). 
According to Sullivan (2009) corporate governance is considered to be a process in which affairs of the firm 
are directed and controlled so as to protect the interest of all stakeholders. Oman (2001) defined corporate 
governance as a term refers to the private and public institutions that include laws, regulations and the business 
practices which governs the relationship between the corporate managers and the stakeholders.  
OECD in 1999 defined corporate governance as "Corporate governance is the system by which business 
corporations are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and 
other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing 
this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance.” 
2.1.2 Participants in Corporate Governance 
Adam Smith in his notable work, The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, concluded that the corporate form of 
organisations, which views the organisations as a separate legal entity. This has a number of implications, one of 
the most important of which is that the company, not the shareholders, owns the company assets, and the company 
is responsible for its liabilities. Only upon liquidation may the shareholders be entitled to the remaining assets after 
the settlement of company debt. This gives the company a lot powers and exposes the shareholders to the risk of 
losing their investment, hence the need for corporations to be closely monitored. 
The legal control and ownership of a limited liability company resides in the shareholders who are typically 
believed to be the owners of the company (Chassagnon & Hollandts 2014). They exercise this responsibility at 
general shareholder meetings. However, the shareholders delegate their powers to a board of directors whom they 
elect. Those directors are held responsible for the activities of the company, and are required to render account of 
stewardship on the affairs of the company to the owners.  
In sequence, the board of directors engage the services of employees who are expected to perform the day-
to-day activities of the organisation. The employees act on behalf of the directors and create direct personal liability 
for company directors. This is why although auditors, and company executives are also dealt with in many 
corporate governance codes, by far, the overwhelming majority of recent corporate governance reform efforts, 
focused on the board of directors. (Vagnuer, 2017) 
2.1.3 Corporate Governance framework 
Corporate governance framework are mechanisms put in place to ensure good governance. They can be broadly 
categorized into two. These include:  external corporate governance framework and internal corporate governance 
framework. 
External Corporate Governance Framework 
The external corporate governance framework provides rules, guidance and controls arising outside an organization 
that are intended to influence the decisions, actions and behaviour that occur within it. This framework is made up 
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of four complex and interrelated elements. The system of intended or emergent processes that provide the external 
guidance, rules and controls that seek to influence actions and behaviours within corporate bodies (Vagnuer 2017).   
These include  
i. Laws and regulations 
ii. Codes of best practice 
Laws and regulation. 
These are legal requirements binding on companies which arise from the acts of parliament and court 
pronouncements. The table below shows specific company legislation that have at some point been binding on 
companies domiciled in Nigeria. 
Table 1: List of Nigerian Promulgations on Company Regulation 
 Law and regulation 
1 Company Ordinance of 1912  
2 Companies Amendment and Extension Act of 1917 
3 Companies Ordinance of 1922 
4 Companies Ordinance of 1929,1941 and 1954 as amended 
7 The 1968 Companies Act 
8 Companies and Allied Matters Decree of 1990, 2004 as amended 
Source: Companies and Allied Matters Decree (1990) 
Codes of Best Practices 
A code of best practice is a set of non-binding principles, standards and practices that have been recommended by 
a distinguished body and that relate to the internal governance of companies 
(Vagnuer, 2017). The following are some of the key codes of best practices issued by bodies in Nigeria. 
Table 2: List of Corporate Governance Codes in Nigeria 
 CODE OF BEST PRACTICE IN NIGERIA ISSUING BODY 
1 Code of Corporate Governance 2018 Financial Reporting Council of 
Nigeria 
2. Code of Corporate Governance 2016 Financial Reporting Council of 
Nigeria 
3. Code of Corporate Governance for the Telecommunication 
Industry 2016  
the Nigerian Communications 
Commission 
4 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and Discount Houses in 
Nigeria 2014  
Central Bank of Nigeria 
5 Nigerian Communications Commission Code 2014 Nigerian Communications 
Commission 
6 Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria 
2011  
Securities and Exchange Commission 
7 Code of Good Corporate Governance for Insurance Industry in 
Nigeria 2009  
National Insurance Commission 
8 Code of Corporate Governance for Licensed Pension Fund 
Operators 2008   
National Pension Commission 
9 Central Bank of Nigeria Code 2006 Central Bank of Nigeria 
10 Securities and Exchange Commission Code 2003 Securities and Exchange Commission 
Source: Financial Reporting Council Code of Corporate Governance 2018 
Internal Corporate Governance Framework 
The internal corporate governance framework focus on internal control practices, accountability and the finance 
function. Internal corporate governance are measures put in place by individual organisations to ensure that the 
external objectives of public policy and behavioural norms are achieved.  In other words, there exists a connection 
between recommendations and mandates from external governance framework and internal governance practice. 
The Board of directors are saddled with the responsibility of providing internal governance mechanisms by 
formulating and ensuring compliance with company-wide policies which should ultimately result in improved firm 
performance.  
2.1.4 Financial Performance 
Financial performance represents the company's financial condition over a specific time period that includes the 
collection and use of funds measured by several indicators of capital adequacy ratio, liquidity, leverage, solvency, 
and profitability. Financial performance is the company's ability to manage and control its resources (Van Horne 
& Wachowicz 2001). 
Financial performance is a measure of a firm’s capacity to create profit, profit or revenue. Financial 
performance can be evaluated from the information provided in the financial statements. The financial statements 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.12, No.6, 2020 
 
34 
consist of; (a) Balance Sheet, (b) Income, (c) Cash flow, (d) Changes in capital (Fatihudin and Mochklas, 2018). 
There are several ratios to measure the company's financial performance and these ratios can be broadly 
classified into five categories such as liquidity ratio, profitability ratio, solvency ratio, efficiency ratio, and leverage 
ratio. Profitability ratios measure the performance of the company in terms of the profit generated over the period 
being considered.   ROI (Return on Investment), ROE (Return on Equity), ROA (Return on Assets), EBIT 
(Earnings Before Interest and Tax) profit are examples of profitability ratios. 
Return on Investment (ROI) is one of the most popular performance measurement and evaluation measures 
adopted in firm performance evaluation. ROI is reliable measure for evaluating financial performance and making 
informed decisions. At present, ROI is widely recognized and accepted in business and financial management in 
both the private and public sectors (Botchkarev and Chiong 2011) 
To calculate ROI, the difference between benefit (return) of an investment (i.e.the net profit for the period) 
and the cost of investment (i.e. capital employed by the company in the period) is divided by the cost of the 
investment; the result is expressed as a percentage or a ratio. 
 !" =
#$%&'()*+'%&,-./+-&/01-/'2)*(%/3 4 5*./'*('%&,-./+-&/''
5*./'*('%&,-./+-&/05$2%/$6'-+26*7-83
×
9::
9
 
ROI has become a popular performance measure for the following reasons. Firstly, ROI is simple to 
understand and to compute. Secondly ROI encourages cost efficiency and focuses on one of the main corporate 
metrics – profitability. Thirdly ROI, being based on accounting records, provides objective results. Fourthly ROI 
allows comparisons of profitability between dissimilar businesses/projects.  
2.1.5 Corporate Governance and Financial Performance  
An effective board not only provides strategic guidance to the company, it also promotes culture of ethical practice 
and good governance. The Board who are the middlemen between the owners of the company and the managers of 
the company are expected to perform their supervisory role   in a bid to ensure that the managers always act in 
favour of the owners of the company.  
Literature provides different measures for evaluating the effectiveness of the board in its disposal of its duties.  
Sheikh N. H., Wang Z. and Khan S. (2013) adopted board size as a measure of the capacity of the board in 
performing its duties, while Shiah-Hou S. R. and Cheng C. W. (2012) relied on directors’ remuneration. Arouri H. 
Et al (2014) believed that a good measure of board efficiency is ownership pattern. Literature also suggests that 
increasing the frequency of board meetings leads to improved performance. Ntim (2009) propounded that a higher 
frequency of board meetings would breed better managerial supervison, and consequently resulting in 
improvement in the firm’s financial performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
Source: Author’s own compilation      
 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
According to Rashid (2011) there are many theories that can be adopted in understanding corporate governance 
concept. However, there are two widely discussed theories and these are principal–agent theory (or agency theory) 
and stakeholder theory (Vagnuer, 2017). This study is underpinned by the principal-agent theory. 
2.2.1 Principal–Agent Theory 
This study's conceptual framework and hypotheses are based on agency theory because it is the most widely used 
theoretical framework for analyzing corporate governance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling,1976). The 
origin of the agency theory is often attributed to Berle and Means (1932) and Adam Smith (1776). According to 
this theory, a problem arises due to the fact that the owners of the firm’s resources are not the managers (Grossman 
& Hart,1986). Letza, Sun and Kirkbride (2004) succinctly describes the agency problem as arising because 
Return on Investment Firm size 
  Debt to equity ratio 
Attendance of board 
meetings 
     Age of the firm 
Board size 
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directors were not likely to be as prudent with other people’s money as with their own.  
These contracting relationship between the owners and directors is known as the agency relationship, which 
is ‘a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent’ (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: 308). 
The agency relationship can be a problem because the directors who are the agent may not always act in the 
best interests of the owners who are the principals.  In a bid to solving the agency problem agency costs have to 
be incurred by the principals. The agency cost includes costs of monitoring the agent, costs incurred by the agent 
due to bonding, and the cost incurred by the principal in providing incentives for the agent 
One implication of the agent –principal relationship is that the managers become more informed about the 
firm than the owners. This results in what is called information asymmetry where agents have better access to 
information than shareholders. One way principals can attempt to overcome the challenge of information 
asymmetry is by monitoring management. However, for individual principals monitoring is costly. The overall 
costs of information-gathering can be reduced by putting in place a reporting system which meets the information 
requirement of all shareholders. 
 
2.3 Empirical review 
Several studies revealed mixed findings in relation to the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. On 
one hand are those whose findings reveal that corporate governance has a negative impact on performance. Some 
of these studies are reviewed as follows: 
Samson and Tarila (2014) examined the impact of corporate governance on financial performance in Nigerian 
banks who adopted the 2012 CBN code. Secondary data was collected from the yearly-published reports of the 
listed banks in Nigeria. Model estimation technique used was regression analysis. Corporate governance was 
denominated using board size and board composition (the ratio of non-executive directors to total directors), and 
corporate governance disclosure index. While financial performance was represented with return on equity (ROE) 
and return on asset (ROA). The results of the study showed that a positive relationship exists between the corporate 
governance variables and the performance variables. 
Similarly, Siddiqui (2015) investigated the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
by conducting a meta-analysis of 25 previous studies. The methodology used is the meta-analysis technique. The 
study represents the external governance mechanisms by anti-takeover provisions and market value of firm 
performance was measured by Tobin’s Q and market to book value.  The author found that the external governance 
mechanism (anti-takeover provisions) exerts more influential effect on firm performance than both external and 
internal governance together. 
Arora and Sharma (2016) examined the impact of corporate governance on firm performance for a large 
representative sample of companies drawn from more than 20 important industries of the Indian manufacturing 
sector for the period 2001-2010. Several alternative specifications and estimation techniques are used for analysis 
purposes, including system generalized methods of moments. Findings reveal that larger boards are associated 
with a greater depth of intellectual knowledge, which in turn leads to improved decision-making and better 
performance. On the other hand, the results show that return on equity and profitability are not related to corporate 
governance indicators. The results also suggest that CEO doubling as Chairman does not affect firm performance. 
The researchers conclude that companies that comply with good corporate governance practices can expect to 
achieve higher accounting and market performances. 
Haque, Faizul, Arun, and Thankom G. (2016) examined the influence of firm-level corporate governance on 
financial performance of the listed firms in Bangladesh. Data collection was done using a questionnaire survey-
based corporate governance index (CGI), which focused on three variables – shareholder rights, independence and 
responsibilities of the board and management, and financial reporting and disclosures. The study results confirm 
the postulation of the principal-agent theory, with a statistically significant positive relationship between a firm’s 
corporate governance quality and its valuation, although the relationship between firm level corporate governance 
and operating performance appears indecisive. Paniagua, Rivelles and Sapena (2018) studied how corporate 
governance and ownership structure impact on the financial performance of firms. We estimated this relationship 
using QCA (qualitative comparative analysis). Model estimation was carried out using complementary linear and 
non-linear multiple regression analysis. The panel data used in the study covered 1207 companies from 59 
countries across 19 sectors for the period 2013 to 2015. The study found a negative relationship between owner 
dispersion, board member dispersion and payment of dividend and Return on Asset. 
Alley, Adebayo and Oligbi.(2016) studied the nature of relationship between corporate governance and 
financial performance. . The results agree with the findings of most previous studies that corporate governance 
significantly affects financial performance. Board skills, board composition and management skills enhanced 
financial performance indicators – return on equity (ROE), return on asset (ROA) and net profit margin. in many 
occasions, significantly. Board size and audit committee size did not, and were found to be capable of undermining 
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financial performance. More importantly, financial performance did not significantly affect corporate governance. 
On the basis of the VEC model, the researchers conclude on a unidirectional causality in the connection between 
corporate governance and financial performance. 
 Jonty, Leon M, Hendrik and Elda. (2018) investigated empirically the existence of industry nuances in the 
relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of companies listed in the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange. A sample of 90 companies from the five largest South African industries, covering a 13-year 
period from 2002 to 2014 (1170 firm-year observations) was examined with three estimation techniques. Results 
from the study indicate that two key trends emerged from this study. First, the relationship between corporate 
governance and company performance differed from industry to industry. Second, the relationship between 
corporate governance and company performance also reacts to changes from steady to non-steady periods. 
Chaudhary and Gakhar (2018) investigated how corporate governance contribute to firms financial 
performance. Board size and the frequency of boards meetings were adopted as measures of corporate governance 
while firms’ financial performance was represented with ROA, ROE, and Earnings per share, Price Earnings ratio. 
The research design of the study was descriptive-cum- diagnostic. The top five automobile companies in India 
were selected on the basis of market capitalization for the period from 2009 to 2013. The study was based on 
secondary data collected from PROWESS database. Multiple regression analysis was carried out. Both board size 
and frequency of board meetings were not statistically significant for all performance measures. 
Patel (2018) studied the impact of corporate governance and performance of companies in selected sectors of 
cement and food and personal care products in Pakistan for the period between 2010 to 2015. Quantitative research 
methodology was used while Pearson's correlation and regression methods were used for data analysis. The study 
discloses that there is a significant negative relationship between firm's performance and share ownership by 
directors. In other words, increase in the directors' ownership results in reduced financial performance. Similarly, 
there is a significant negative relationship found between the firm's performance and number of independent 
directors. However, there is an insignificant relationship between performance and concentration of the share 
ownership. 
 Akinleye and Fajuyagbe (2019) in their focused on the impact of corporate governance and performance of 
selected Nigerian multinational firms from 2012 to 2016. They adopted   board size, activism and committee 
activism as the proxies of corporate governance and used return on asset and firm growth rate as proxies of firm 
financial performance. Using static panel estimation techniques, secondary data collected from four multinational 
firms were analyzed. Results indicate that while board size and board activism exerted significant negative impact 
on return on asset, committee activism exerted insignificant impact. The results of the study further showed that 
board size and board activism exert insignificant negative impact on firm’s growth rate, while committee activism 
insignificantly spurs firm’s growth rate. 
On the basis of the above studies, it can be inferred that there is no conclusive relationship of board size and 
frequency of board meetings with financial performance of the firms. Hence a need to find out this relationship 
within the Nigerian context.  None of the studies considered the intervening effect of control variables such as firm 
size, age of the company and importantly debt to equity ratio. Secondly, this research work adopts as its estimation 
technique the Pooled Ordinary Least squares (POLS) method while robustly. This is expected to result in a more 
reliable result. 
 
3. Methodology 
This work adopts the survey research design to ascertain the degree of the causal relationship which exists between 
the attendance of board meetings and audit committee meetings (being two measures of the strength of corporate 
governance) and ROI (as a proxy of firm performance). Panel Data was obtained on 15 quoted companies over the 
5-year period from 2014 to 2018. The source of data for the study were the companies’ annual reports. 
The study utilizes the Pooled Ordinary Least Square POLS estimation technique. The POLS is an empirical 
model which is based on the Gauss Mankov assumptions of a constant variance of the error term and a mean error 
term that equals zero. Being a time series data, the data set will tend to be characterized by the correlation of 
subsequent error terms (i.e. autocorrelation) whereby contemporaneous error terms include delayed copy of itself. 
In effect, the standard error tends to be overestimated and this reduces the statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients. To address this, this study adopts the Newey West (1987) robust standard error measure which 
insulates the computed standard error from the effects of autocorrelation and as such allows for a fair assessment 
of the statistical significance of regression estimates. 
Apart from a regression analysis, this work also evaluates the degree of significance of the correlation 
coefficients in order to determine the predictability of firm value given certain changes in the two proxies of 
corporate governance namely attendance of board meeting and attendance of audit committee meeting. Summary 
statistics such as to capture the character. 
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Model Specification 
The primary set of objectives of this study which forms the basis of the first and second hypotheses, is to find the 
causal relationship between the proxies of corporate governance and firm performance. To achieve this, firm 
performance is modelled as the dependent variable while Attendance of board meetings ABS, and Board Size BDS 
are stated as two   primary explanatory variable while other control variables such as ASS, DER, AGE are included 
as mediating variables. Afterwards, the variables are operationalized by imputing them into the model. 
The implication of this is that the model becomes a level-level model, the coefficients of which will rather 
measure unit change in the dependent variable due to a level change in the regressors. 
ROI = f (ABM, BDS, ASS, DER, AGE) …………………………(I) 
ROI i,t   =   α + β1 ABM i,t + β2 BDS i,t+ β3 ASS i,t + β4 DER i,t+ β5 AGE i,t + µi,t……………………….(II) 
Table 3: Description of Variables and Parameters 
Variables Definition  
ROI Return on Investment Fir m performance 
ABM Attendance of Board meetings/Board 
Activity 
Corporate governance 
BDS Board Size Corporate governance 
ASS Asset  Company size 
DER Debt Equity Ratio Capital Structure  
AGE Number of years of operation Age 
µi,t Error term Measure of variation in the dependent variable due to 
unobserved variables 
 Constant  
β 1 – β 5 Parameters of the Model 
The second set of objectives of this study is to determine the existence and extent of the linear relationship 
between each of the measures of corporate governance on the one hand and firm performance on the other hand. 
The levels of significance would also be ascertained, using the Pearson correlation matrix. It is expected that where 
any two variables are significantly correlated, the correlation coefficient (R) will exceed 0.5 and the t statistic 
should exceed 
  
4. Results and Discussions. 
4.1 Result  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4: Result of Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
ROI 59 0.0900012     0.2014434       -0.873        0.866 
ABM 59 0.8816181     0.1002996 .6166667           1 
BDS 59 9.661017     2.616988           6 16 
ASS 59 150000000000 391000000000   565000000   1720000000000 
DER 59 0.5390461       0.972735 -2.594       3.374 
AGE 59 33.71186     21.82458           1          73 
Source: Researcher’s Computation  
This work utilized a total of 59 observations on 15 quoted companies, implying that the data is an unbalanced 
panel. This however has no effect on the results obtained therefrom. The summary statistics entail the average ROI, 
Attendance at board meetings, Board size, Company Size, Debt-Equity Ratio, Age and Proportion of board 
meetings attended by directors of the 15 firms studied. While the mean ROI is 9%, the average attendance by 
board members in all sampled companies is 88.16%, the average board size is approximately 10 members. Of the 
two proxies of corporate governance, Board size returns a higher degree of variation with a standard deviation of 
2.616988 which exceeds the standard deviation of attendance of Board meetings. The distribution of attendance 
of board meeting is fairly normal as over 95% of the 59 observations fall within 2 standard deviations.  
The company with the highest ROI recorded 0.3794, the minimum was however -0.873 which denotes 
negative returns on Investment. The largest company in the sample, in terms of size, has assets worth N172billion 
while the minimum has assets which are by book value worth N565million.  The company which has been in 
operation for the longest period of time had operated for 73 years in the year sampled. 
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Regression 
H01: There is no significant causal relationship between ABM and ROI 
H02 : There is no significant causal relationship between BDS and ROI 
Table 5: Result of the Regression result. 
 Coefficient t-Statistics Prob-value 
C 0.5276683 
(0.266266 ) 
-1.98 0.053 
ABM 0.4912553 
(0.2578226) 
1.91 
   
0.062   
 
BDS 0.022623 
(0.0132034) 
1.71 
 
0.092 
ASS -0.0000000000000625 
(0.0000000000000907) 
-0.69 0.494 
DER -0.0570531 
(0.0266  ) 
-2.14 0.037 
AGE 0.000182 
(.00117) 
0.16 0.877 
F 2.40   
Prob(F) 0.0492 
R2 0.1846 
Source: Researcher’s Computation. 
The regression results show that the ROI attains a minimum value of 0.5276683 which represents the return 
on Investment when all regressors within the model are equated to zero. The parameter estimate of ABM- 
Attendance at Board Meetings, is 0.4912553 which is positive and statistically significant at 10% significance 
level. Also, the coefficients of the other four right hand side variables - BDS, ASS, DER and AGE are 0.022623, 
-0.0000000000000625, -0.0570531, 0.000182 respectively. Apart from the constant term, two other estimates are 
statistically significant at 10% level of significance while a third is significant at 5% level of significance. 
As such, if ABM is considered as a good measure of corporate governance, and a percentage increase in ABM 
seems to bring about a 49.12% increase in the ROI of firms, we can conclude that corporate governance has a 
positive effect on firm performance. Likewise, each additional member that increases board size leads to an 
increase in ROI by 2.226%. Importantly, the model is considered to be statistically significant with an F statistic 
of 2.4 and a prob value of 0.0492 which is less than 0.05 and so implies that the model is statistically significant. 
The R2 shows that 18.46% of the variation in ROI is accounted for by changes in the regressors. 
As such we reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant causal relationship between firm performance 
and Attendance of Board meetings. In the same vein. The null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship 
between firm performance and Board size is also rejected.   
Correlation 
H03  : There is no significant linear relationship between ABM and ROI 
H04 : There is no significant linear relationship between BDS and ROI 
Table 6: Results of Correlation Matrix 
 ROI ABM BDS ASS DER AGE 
ROI 1      
ABM 0.2676 
( 0.0404) 
1     
BDS 0.2170 
( 0.0988  ) 
0.0828 
(0.5331) 
1    
ASS 0.1662       0.2266    0.6700 1   
DER -0.2695   -0.0881    0.0537   -0.1231 1  
AGE 0.0640    0.0976   -0.0579    0.0613   -0.1629 1 
Source: Researcher’s Computation 
The pairwise correlational matrix shows the extent of the linear relationship between the variables studied. 
The result above proves that there exists a positive but weak relationship between ROI (a measure of firm 
profitability) and Attendance of board meetings, where r = +0.2676, and as the p value (0.0404) is lower than 0.05 
the linear relationship between ABM and ROI is said to be statistically significant at 95% confidence interval.  The 
second proxy of corporate governance used in this study- BDS proves also to have a significantly positive but 
weak relationship with ROI, having r = 0.2170, and a prob-value of 0.0988. The relationship between the two 
proxies of corporate governance ABM and BDS is however statistically insignificant at the 90% level of 
significance. 
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Hence, we reject the null hypothesis three (H03) that there is no significant linear relationship between 
Attendance of Board Meetings(ABM) and firm performance (ROI). Also, we reject the null hypothesis four (H04) 
that there is no significant relationship between Board Size (BDS) and Firm Performance(ROI).  
 
5. Conclusion  
This study sought to examine the effect of Board Activity and Board Size on the Firm Performance. The Board of 
Directors in any organization is not only a lynch pin which determines the strategic outlook of the organization 
and steers its activities. but a fundamental element of the corporate governance system. Its major responsibilities 
are to connect the owners of the organization to the management, to orientate, oversee and advise the management 
on carry on the business in a manner that protects the interest of the shareholders. The theoretical framework upon 
which this work rests is the Principal-Agent theory, which highlight the important role the Board plays in ensuring 
the interest of shareholders (i.e the principal) are protected by their representatives who are collectively referred 
to as the board 
In the course of this study, several studies were reviewed and the common purpose was to establish or validate 
the claim that there exists a causal and or correlational relationship between Board effectiveness, activity, size on 
the one hand and financial performance of the firm on the other hand. Different results have been obtained so while 
some studies reckon that Board size and activity are not significant in determining firm performance, others opine 
on the contrary. This study however found that Board activity and size both affect firm performance significantly. 
The level of Board Activity was proxied by attendance of board meetings, while firm performance was 
measured by the ROI.  The model also included other variables such as Board size, Total Asset, Debt-Equity Ratio 
and the Number of years of operation of the firms.  Stylized data obtained from the annual reports of the firms 
were utilized in determining the causal and correlational relationships between the dependent variable and the 
regressors. The results obtained show that both ABM and BDS have a significant positive effect on firm 
performance, to such an extent that a 1% improvement in attendance of board meetings will bring about a 0.4912 
increase in firm performance. In the case of other regressors, results show that a 1% increase in both DER brings 
about a reduction of 0.527 in the ROI of the firm. The coefficients estimated for AGE and ASS are statistically 
insignificant at 95% confidence interval. 
The correlation matrix shows that there exists a statistically significant linear relationship between ABM and 
ROI, as well as between BDS and ROI. Based on the results obtained H01, H02, H03, and H04 are therefore rejected 
similar to the findings of J. Paul (2017), K.I. Al-Daoud, Saidin and Abidin (2016); Mululu (2005). 
By way of recommendation, shareholders and other stakeholder should demand complete director’s report at 
Annual General Meetings to ensure that directors’ attendance at board meetings will be open to public scrutiny. 
Also as Board activity/attendance of Board meetings has proven to be a strong predictor of firm performance 
shareholders can rely on the attendance of board meetings by board members and size of the board in guiding their 
expectations and making comparisons between their investments in various companies.  Also shareholders should 
de-emphasize firm size and age of company in taking investment decisions as both have proven to be insignificant 
in determining the Returns on Investment. With regard to novelties, future studies can consider other measures of 
board effectiveness such as board diversity and Number or frequency of meetings.  Similarly, future research 
works in this regard would do well to use a larger sample. Although, this has utilized ROI as a measure of firm 
performance other non-financial measures can be considered in future research works. 
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